Abstract. We study fixation in large, but finite populations with two types, and dynamics governed by birth-death processes. By considering a restricted class of such processes, which includes most classical evolutionary processes, we derive a continuous approximation for the probability of fixation that is valid beyond the weak-selection (WS) limit. Indeed, in the derivation three regimes naturally appear: selection-driven, balanced, and quasi-neutral -the latter two require WS, while the former can appear with or without WS. From the continuous approximations, we then obtain asymptotic approximations for evolutions with at most one equilibrium, in the selection-driven regime, that does not preclude a weak-selection regime. As an application, we show that the fixation pattern for the Hawk and Dove game satisfies what we term the one-half law: if the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) is outside a small interval around 1 /2, the fixation is of dominance type. We also show that outside of the weak-selection regime the dynamics of large populations can have very little resemblance to the infinite population case. In addition, we also show results for the case of two equilibria. Finally, we present a continuous restatement of the definition of an ESS N strategy, that is valid for large populations. We then present two applications of this restatement: we obtain a definition valid in the quasi-neutral regime that recovers the one-third law under linear fitness and, as a generalisation, we introduce the concept of critical-frequency.
1. Introduction 1.1. Background. One of the most natural questions addressed in the study of evolution is its eventual fate. In an number of settings, it is known that only one type will be present at sufficiently long times. This is know as fixation, and its likelihood is know as the fixation probability of a given type. This has been studied since the works by Wright [47] , Fisher [16] , Moran [31] and Kimura [23] for the case of neutral evolution, and frequency independent fitness, both in discrete and continuous settings [14, 33] .
An alternative approach was also taken by game-theorists who, in some appropriate sense, were developing a mathematical description of the Darwinian theory of evolution [27] . Among the models studied, possibly the most popular is the Replicator Dynamics, which assumes an infinite and well-mixed population [39] . Differently from the finite population case, it is possible to find mixed stable populations, and this leads to the development of what is currently known as an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) [21] .
Historically, the blending of these approaches began with the use of diffusion approximations to obtain continuous frequency-independent models that should be valid in the large population limit [15, 23] . See [19] for a critical view on the use of diffusion approximations. Later on, we have the formulation of evolution in finite poplations with frequency dependent fitness [34, 38] ; see also [33] . A notable exception of this dichotomy is [13] , where the formulation of a frequency dependent version of the Wright-Fisher process, together with its continuous limit under what is presently known as the weak-selection regime, cf. [14] , are already discussed.
More recently, a number of different studies attempted to blend the infinite population ideas of evolutionary game-theory to the randomness of stochastic finite population models using different approaches, both in terms of the modelling assumptions and of mathematical rigour [9-12, 17, 24, 25, 28, 40-42, 45] .
Fixation probability in finite large populations, under the assumption of a mean-field approximation has been studied by Kimura [23] and by Gillespie [18] . More recently, without such assumption, it has also been studied by [3] with a focus on the invasion coefficients. It was also studied in [42, 43] as part of more general studies on stochastic invasion and fixation, and evolutionary stability and also under the weak-selection regime by [2] , who studied the Fermi process and the frequency dependent Moran process, but with a focus on fixation time rather than fixation probabilites. Further studies are [5] which tackled the study of fixation for coordination and co-existence situations using large-deviation theory, although for the latter it had more attention to approximation of quasi-stationary probability distribution, and a study in on random fluctuations about the meta-stable state in [30] . All these studies tackle the problem directly form the discrete description. For a variation on the Fermi process that might become deterministic at finite population size, see [1] .
The aim of this work is to further contribute to these studies by obtaining results regarding the fixation probability that can make use of continuous approximations that are valid for large populations, but that do not require an infinite population limit to be valid. In particular, no weak-selection assumption will be necessary for deriving these approximations. This procedure allows to obtain results that highlight how large, but finite populations have fixation patterns that can be very peculiar to this regime, while still having some connection with both finite and infinite frameworks.
1.2.
Outline. In Section 2, we provide the general formulation for the processes we shall address in this work. We term such processes Suitable Birth Death (SBD) processes. In Section 3, we define what we call a regular family of SBD processes. For such processes, we justify the use of a diffusive approximation, valid for large, but finite, size N . Such an approximation does not require the weak-selection limit to be derived, but it relies instead on the smoothness of the transition probabilities which, in turn, depends on the corresponding fitness functions. The qualitative nature of the fixation probabilities will depend not only on the functional form of fitness functions themselves, but also on what we denote the intensity of selection. Depending on the behaviour of intensity of selection as N goes to infinity, we identify three natural regimes: selection-driven, balanced, and quasi-neutral; the last two can only appear in the so-called weak-selection regime.
We then proceed to study the fixation probabilities in the selection-drive regime in Section 4, with the assumption that there is at most one neutral point (a point in which both fitness are equal), and then we necessarily have either dominance, coexistence or coordination. For the dominance case we recover a number of formulae in the literature in a unified framework. For coexistence we obtain a novel formula. For coordination, we obtain a generalisation, in terms of range of validity, of previously obtained formulae [5, 30] .
In section 5, we show using the coexistence formulae derived in the previous section, that the fixation in the presence of a deterministic ESS can be quite distinguished from what would be expected on grounds of a deterministic approach. In the case of weak-selection, and linear logdifferences at leading order, we obtain what we call the near one-half law: if the deterministic ESS is located exactly at one-half, then the fixation probability plateau is at one-half. However, if the ESS equilibrium is outside of a small region-in a precise sense-around one-half then the one has dominance by one of the types. Moreover, in the case of absence of weak selection, we show how equivalent games can lead to completely different fixation patterns. In particular, one can have a significant frequency of a particular type at the deterministic ESS, and nevertheless one might also have almost certain extinction of this type. In addition, we also briefly discuss fixation in the presence of two equilibria. The results here are also new, and show that an ESS can either block or allow a tunnelling of the evolution.
In section 6, we discuss how to use the continuous approximation derived in section 3 to obtain a rewriting of the ESS definition for large populations, creating a new definition for the celebrated ESS N concept. We then derive an asymptotic approximation in the quasi-neutral regime, that can be used to obtain a simplified condition for the existence of an ESS N in a finite, large population. As a special case of such condition, we obtain the celebrated one-third law when the leading-order log-differences of the fitness is linear [34] . We then study the existence of ESS N in more general contexts, and obtain what we call the critical frequency curves for the coordination cases. In the case of selection driven regimes, we show how the asymptotic formulae can be used to simplify the computation of such curves.
Finally, a discussion of the results is presented in section 7.
General formulation
We shall consider birth-death processes in a population of size N with two types A and B. For
In particular, we denote the fraction of type A individuals in the population by
The transition probabilities 1 ≥ T
indicates the probability that in a population with xN type A individuals, the next generation has xN + 1 (xN , xN − 1, respec.) type A individuals and are given by
. A birth-death process with these properties will be denoted a Suitable Birth-Death process or a SBD process for short. A similar class of processes has been studied by [5, 30] .
Among the many models contemplated in this set-up, the most common ones are: Frequency dependent Moran process:
Linear Moran process:
Fermi process:
3. Approximations for the fixation probabilities in large populations 3.1. A general continuous approximation. We consider SBD processes, with fitness functions given by Ψ
The fixation probability is then given by [4] (1)
with c N chosen such that Φ N (1) = 1.
As observed above, a number of approximations for large N to equation (1) have been obtained previously, in different regimes. It turns out that we can obtain such an approximation, that is valid for a number of different regimes, at the expense of requiring some extra regularity in the log-difference of the fitness part of the process. In order to this, we introduce a number of definitions.
Definition 1 (Generalised log relative fitness). We define the generalised log difference of fitness as
We also say that the evolution satisfies weak-selection, if
Remark 1. Weak selection means that both types perform nearly as well in large population.
Nevertheless, a precise quantification of "nearly" is needed in order to determine the resulting dynamics. In particular, different scalings for such decay can lead to very different dynamics. For example, if
. This is consistent with the classical weak-selection assumption; see [33] . See also [9, 10] for discussion on the different possible scalings. N . We shall say that such a family is regular, if Θ N satisfies the following conditions:
In addition, if weak-selection holds, then we ask for k = 1; otherwise we require that k = 2.
Remark 2. Definition 2 includes weak-selection, size-independent fitness functions among many other settings, provided that the underlying fitness functions are sufficient regular, which turns out to be satisfied by most applications and examples in the literature. Notice also that this contrasts with less stringent assumptions used to justify a diffusion limit-cf. [9, 10] For a family of regular SBD processes, we can approximate equation (1) as follows:
Theorem 1. Assume that we have a regular family of SBD processes. Let
Then, for sufficient large N , the fixation probability can be approximated as follows:
Furthermore, k is the regularity of θ required at definition 2.(2).
The proof of this result is given in Appendix A.
Remark 3.
Observe that the bound in (2) is a relative one rather than an absolute one. Namely, we can rewrite (2) as
Hence, the approximation is uniformly accurate, in the number of correct digits, for the entire range of fixation probabilities. This will be of importance in Section 6, where we shall use (2) to compare possibly very small fixation probability values. very small for large N . In the former case, we shall say that evolution is in the selection-driven regime, while in the latter we shall say that it is in the quasi-neutral regime. Notice that we can have a selection-driven regime, within weak-selection. A possible classification scheme is given in Table 1 . For a derivation of the infinite population limit with appropriate scalings see [9, 10] .
Pure diffusion See [9, 10] . Table 1 . Different regimes for both finite and infinite populations.
In the cases that we dot not have κ N = O (1) for large N , we shall say that the corresponding regime is not balanced. It turns out that we can describe the non-balanced regimes in a very complete way, and we proceed to do so as follows.
Selection-driven regime asymptotics
We shall now assume that we have a selection driven evolutionary dynamics, and choose N to be fixed and large so that κ −1 N 1. For such a fixed N , we will write κ = κ N and, from now on, we will indicate the dependence on κ rather than on N .
Then, either by assuming that θ is C 1 and that we are in the weak-selection regime, or that θ is C 2 otherwise, we are interested in the asymptotic behaviour of (3), within the error bounds given in (2) . Throughout this Section we will assume that θ is C 2 , and all equalities involving φ κ have an implied O (κ), except when discussing the coordination case, where they have an implied O ( √ κ). Furthermore, if we assume that θ is monotonic, then all error terms can be taken be exponentially small. Derivations of the asymptotic expressions presented in this Section are provided in Appendix B 4.1. Dominance. The dominance case has been studied in a number of regimes by [23] , and also by [18] . The approximations presented in the following recover the previous results when in the appropriate regimes, but also inherit the large validity of (2) .
For dominance of one of the types, we have either that θ(x) > 0, A is dominant, or θ(x) < 0, B is dominant. In the former case, we obtain:
In the latter case , we find:
Remark 4. In the context of the derivation of (2), κ
N provides an alternative definition of effective population size. In the nonneutral case, effective population size is not equal to the population size, and this has some implication in the context of invasions. As an example, we consider dominance by A. In this case, from equation (4), we then have
In general, Θ N ∞ can have a strong dependence on N . Thus, it can be either very large or small and not just order one as it would be expected from the non-frequency dependent case.
4.2.
Coexistence. It turns out that the crucial quantity for understanding the fixation in this case is F(1). Indeed, we shall have three possible cases as follows:
F (1) κ: the asymptotic approximation is given by (4); F (1) −κ: the asymptotic approximation is given by (5); |F(1)| ∼ κ: In this case, let
Then the asymptotic approximation is given by
and therefore equation (6) reduces to (4) (to (5), respectively). Notice also that the graph of (6), for small k appart from boundary layers of order κ at the endpoints, is essentially a horizontal line at the level γ/(C + γ). We shall denote this level by the Fixation Probability Plateau (FPP).
Remark 6. Equation (6) can be seen as a convex combination of the equations (4) and (5), and hence in a sense the coexistence case interpolates between the two dominance cases.
4.3.
Coordination. In the coordination case we have:
2 /2 dy is the normal cumulative distribution. If, in addition, we have that x * √ κ, and 1 − x * √ k then (7) can be simplified to
Thus, for x * far from the endpoints we have the interesting result that
On the other hand, if x * = √ κx withx = O (1), we then have that
where as, if x * = κx instead, we find that
4.4.
Remarks on the formulae. Formulas (4) and (5) 
with appropriate boundary conditions, for constant fitness differences, i.e., Θ N (x) = c, with c > 0 for dominance by A, and c < 0 for dominance by B. Equation (7) is the exact solution for the case of linear fitness difference, and weak selection. In this sense, these results shows that an arbitrary pay-off difference is equivalent to a linear fitness difference with the same signal pattern across the unit interval. The case of coexistence is different altogether. Nevertheless, we would like to point out a kind of duality between coordination and coexistence regarding φ κ (x) for different x, and φ κ (x * ) for different x * as shown in Figure 1 . Duality between coexistence and coordination fixation patterns in the linear fitness case. The coexistence fixation when x * = 1/2 is similar to fixation at the equilibrium point in the case of coordination, as this equilibrium runs the unit interval. Analogously, the coordination fixation, also when x * = 1/2, is similar to the fixation at equilibrium for the coexistence case, for different values of x * in [0,1].
Fixation in the presence of a deterministic interior ESS
We say that two types coexist if there is a stable state where both types are present. In the deterministic approach -namely, in the replicator dynamics case [21] -this happens only if there is a point x * ∈ (0, 1) such that Ψ (A) (x * ) = Ψ (B) (x * ). However, this condition says nothing about the stability of this point under small perturbations. We say that a point x * is an asymptotically stable equilibrium, if it is an equilibrium and sufficiently close states will be attracted to x * . It can be shown that an equilibrium x * ∈ (0, 1) is asymptotically stable if there exists ε 0 > 0, such that
. This is the origin of the concept of evolutionary stable strategy, or ESS [36] .
However, in the finite population case, there is no non-trivial stable state [22] . Therefore, the coexistence case is where both modelling paradigms -finite population (stochastic) and infinite population (deterministic) -differ more markedly. The solution to this apparent contradiction is the fact that, in this case, the finite population model has a quasi-stationary distribution that leads to the existence of a metastable dynamics which lasts for a time that increases exponentially with the population size [3, 10, 29] . In the one-dimensional setting with a coexistence equilibrium that is far from the boundaries, this dynamics can be approximately described by an Ornstein-Ullenbeck process with a long term mean around the coexistence equilibrium [44] .
Intuitively, one might expect, since the dynamics is most likely to develop in the vicinity of the deterministic equilibrium, that the fixation is largely independent of the state that one is observing in a certain moment, and more related to the equilibrium level.
As we shall now see, while the former intuition is correct, the latter is not.
5.1.
The near one-half law. We shall now want to study the dynamics in the case of coexistence, and weak selection, but selection-driven regime. We consider the following fitness differences:
with α > 0 and A, B, C, D > 0 associated to a pay-off matrix ( A B C D ) that yields a coexistence equilibrium. This is equivalent to specify
with γ > 0 and x * ∈ (0, 1). We have the following result:
Theorem 2. Assume the we are in the coexistence case, weak-selection but selection-driven regime. Assume also that we have linear limiting fitness differences, i.e., θ(x) =γ(x * − x), x * ∈ (0, 1).
whereγ := 1 max{x * ,1−x * } . Then, we have the following scenarios, with c being a constant O (1): There are values 0 < x 1 < y 1 < 1 /2 < y 2 < x 2 < 1, such that x 1 is near zero, x 2 is near one, both y 1 and y 2 are near 1 /2 and with the property that if x * < y 1 : Then, for all x < x 2 , the fixation probability of B is near unity. x * = 1/2: Then, for all x ∈ (x 1 , x 2 ), we have near 1 ⁄2 probability of fixation for both types. x * > y 2 : Then, for all x > x 1 , we have that the fixation probability of A is near unity.
Here, the statement X is near Y means that
Proof. This follows from the direct calculation that F(1) =γ(x * − 1 /2). The results then follow from equation (6) .
As an illustration of this behaviour, we show in Figure 2 the fixation probability for the Θ N considered in Theorem 2. The variation with x * observed in this figure suggest that the fixation pattern changes very fast in the vicinity of the x * = 1 /2 from dominance of B to dominance of A. Thus a coexistence layer, in the sense that both types have a significant probability of fixation, exists only when x * is close to one-half. This behaviour is further illustrated Figure 3 , where we plot Φ x * (x * ) for x * ∈ (0, 1).
5.2.
Fixation in the absence of weak-selection. In the absence of weak-selection, the fixation behaviour for the coexistence case can be much more varied. Consider the payoff matrix, independent of N , given by I II I A B II C D Assuming self-interaction, i.e., that each individual plays the game against him/herself, then the corresponding log-difference of the fitness is given by
which is independent of N . We assume C > A, B > D. Notice that, in this case, we have
From which we then obtain
Notice that the above expression is neither translation or multiplicative invariant. Hence, as far as fixation is concerned, the absolute values of the entries in the payoff matrix -and not only their relative values -are important.
Remark 7. We point out that form of Θ N used above is a slight simplification, since the usual assumption is that an individual does not play against himself. In this more conventional case, i.e., without self-interaction, we find
Notice, however, that the difference between both fitness log-differences is O ( 1 /N), and hence the fixation pattern is the same, if N is sufficient large. In particular, the continuous approximation does not change.
As an example, consider the particular payoff matrix:
Then, Θ N (0) = log(1.00068) > 0 and Θ N (1) = log(0.99773) < 0. Hence we are in the coexistence case, and the unique equilibrium is at x * = 3/4. As for the fixation pattern, a direct computation yields
Thus, the fixation of A is almost certain, if N is sufficiently large. On the other hand, if we subtract ten from the previous matrix, we obtain I II I 1 100.075 II 1.025 100
and we now obtain
In this case, extinction of A is now almost certain -again, if N is large enough. In Figure 4 , we can see the variation effect of adding a constant c to all entries of the payoff-matrix. Figure 4 . Behaviour of F(1) as a constant c is added to the pay-off matrix above. One can then see that, by adding a constant, one can obtain the full spectrum of possible evolutions in the case of coexistence dynamics, and that the actual level of equilibrium can have little influence on the outcome.
5.3.
A general result for fixation plateaus. The previous results also show that in the absence of weak-selection, the FPP is structurally unstable for large populations, since a perturbation of order κ in in the model parameters might change F(1) by an order one value, and thus significantly alter the corresponding fixation pattern. We shall now see that this behaviour is by no means exceptional. Notice that this structural instability for large, but finite N , while being a finite population effect, is diverse from the difference in fixation patterns usually studies via, for instance, the concept of ESS N ; see section 6. The FPP indicates the likelihood of fixation of either type. For if the FPP is close to zero, we have essentially dominance of B, while if the FPP is close to unity will have essentially dominance of A. For values of the FPP close to 1 /2, the evolution is fair in the sense that both types have very similar fixation probabilities. We will now show that the phenomena in Theorem 2 is more robust. κ, there will be values around λ 0 such that the F P P will change from near dominance of A to near dominance of B.
Proof. Existence of the function of x(λ) follows from a standard argument using the implicit function theorem. Suppose that such a function is not unique. Then there exists λ ∈ L and x 1 (λ) < x 2 (λ) such that θ(x 1 (λ), λ) = θ(x 2 (λ), λ) = 0. Hence, there ∂ x θ(x, λ) must vanish in the interval (x 1 , x 2 ) contradicting its negative-definiteness. Writing
we see, by taking λ sufficiently close to λ − or to λ + , that we can have both F(1, λ) −κ and F (1, λ) κ, for different values of λ. Hence, the FPP can have all values from very near zero to very near unity.
Remark 8. Many different forms of Theorem 3 can be formulated. The crucial points, for the result to hold, are that I = O (1), and that the interval (λ − , λ + ) is sufficiently large in both directions.
5.4.
Blockage and tunnelling in evolution. We now take a small detour. For given fitnesses functions, assume the associated deterministic model given by the replicator equations; consider additionally that there are multiple non-trivial equilibria in the replicator equation. For simplicity, let us assume that there are only two equilibria, i.e., x 1 and x 2 are the only solutions in (0, 1) such that Ψ (A) (x) = Ψ (B) (x). We assume, in case I, that x 1 is unstable and x 2 is stable and in case II, the other way round.
5.4.1. Case I. For case I, we have that x 1 is a local maximum for −F, and x 2 is a local minimum. Therefore, the global maximum of −F can be either at x = x 1 or at x = 1. Hence, we have the following subcases:
κ: Fixation is given by (7), with x * replaced by x 1 .;
−κ: Fixation is given by (5);
Then, we have:
Notice that, if C → ∞, then (9) reduces to (5), whereas if C → 0 it reduces to (7).
The above result shows that, if we have F(1) smaller than F(x 1 ) then the ESS acts as a blockade to the evolution, and hence the extinction of A is almost certain. Figure 5 . Relative configuration of maxima and minima for case I.
Case II.
For case II, we have that x 1 is a local minima for −F, while x 2 is a local maximum. Thus the global maximum of −F can occur only at x = 0 or x = x 2 . This yields the following subcases:
Fixation is given by (7), with x * replaced by x 2 .; F(x 2 ) κ: Fixation is given by (4);
Notice that, if C → ∞, then (10) reduces to (7), whereas if C → 0 it reduces to (4).
In this case, the ESS equilibria acts as a "tunnel" and the evolution almost certainly will cross the evolution barrier imposed by x 2 , and thus fixation of A is almost certain. Figure 6 . Relative configuration of maxima and minima for case II.
Remark 9. Along the lines of remark 6, we point out that both equations (9) and (10) can be seen as convex combinations of coordination with either dominance by B in the former or dominance by A in the latter.
ESS in large populations
6.1. A continuous definition. As already observed in the introduction, the definition of ESS N given by [33, 34] has been widely accepted as a working definition for ESS for finite populations, although earlier definitions have also been given [32, 35, 36] ; see also [26] . For the convenience of the reader, we recall this definition, but formulated in a compatible notation.
Definition 3 (ESS N
. Consider a SBD process with a population size N , with Φ N denoting the probability of fixation of A. We say that strategy B is an ESS N if the following is satisfied:
For a family of regular SBD processes, definition 3 can be recast in the continuous framework for fixation probabilities, provided N is sufficient large as the next result shows: On the other hand, notice that φ κ satisfies
Hence,
and then φ κ (0) > 0 as claimed.
Condition (2) is compatible with the error term given by (2) , provided N is sufficiently large.
Remark 10.
Conditions (1) and (2) in the theorem above can be replaced by (1)|. In this case, N has only to be large enough so that (2) holds. Notice that the conditions in Theorem 4 can be obtained from those above, by approximating φ k (1/N ) by φ κ (0) in the first condition and by neglecting the |o| term in the second condition.
Following the ideas in Theorem 3, we will allow for the possibility that θ may have also a dependence on a parameter vectorλ, that we will indicate by writing θ = θ(x, λ). In this sense, the fixation is also dependent on λ, and will indicate this by writing φ κ = φ κ,λ (x).
For evolutions that satisfiy the first condition for the existence of an ESS, the condition on the fixation probability of an invader required by (2) in Theorem 4 suggest the following definition:
Definition 4 (Critical parameters). The set of critical parameters for a population of size N is defined as
Such a set can be thought as defining a boundary, in parameter space, dividing ESS N strategies, for non-ESS N strategies. For the particular case of linear fitness-differences-i.e. in the weakselection regime-we have θ(x) = γ(x − x * ). Without loss of generality, we can use σ 2 = κ/γ and x * as parameters. For a fixed σ, one expects that for sufficient small x * the fixation probability of a invader will be equal to 1/N , and hence that (σ, x * ) will be in the critical parameter set. We shall term such an equilibrium x * a critical frequency at variance σ, or simply a critical frequency.
6.2. ESS N in the quasi-neutral regime: generalisations of the one-third law. Before tackling the general case, we shall investigate the quasi-neutral case. We begin by an asymptotic result for the continuous approximation given by (2) that is valid in this regime:
Theorem 5. Consider a regular family of Moran processes in the quasi-neutral regime. Then we have that
with R = O (1) and smooth. Moreover, its derivatives are also order one.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix C. With this asymptotic result, we can now obtain a general condition so that strategy B is an ESS N , when N is large and we are in a restricted quasi-neutral regime.
Theorem 6. Assume that we are in the quasi-neutral regime with κ −1 = o ( 1 /N), and that we are in the coordination case. Then strategy B is an ESS N if, and only if,
Proof. Differentiating twice (11) yields
Hence φ κ (0) > 0 if, and only if, θ(0) < 2κ
On noticing that G(0) = G (0) = 0, and that G (0) = θ(0). We find that
The last expression is negative if, and only if,
Remark 11. Naturally, for very large N , we will have κ −1 very small in the quasi-neutral regime. Since, it is possible to show that the remainder term at every order must vanish at zero, we can rephrase the conditions of the Theorem 6 as that the left hand side of all inequalities should be negative. However, these conditions are sufficient, but not necessary in general. On the other hand, if we write Ψ (A,B) = 1 + ω(N )ψ (A,B) , with ω(N ) 1, we can then identify κ −1 N ω(N ) up to multiple that is independent of N . Thus, in this more conventional setting, we see that if N is not large enough so that 1 /N is negligible, then we need the further assumption that N 2 ω(N ) 1 instead of the usual assumption N ω(N ) 1. These observations go along with the results in [48] .
Remark 12. For large N , and for θ with a parameter dependence given by θ(x, λ), we see that Theorem 6 specifies that the critical parameter set can be approximated for small κ by the following equation:
In particular case where the leading-order log-difference of fitness is linear, we recover a slightly generalised version of the calculation in [43] and we obtain the celebrated one-third law:
Proposition 1 (one-third law). Consider the case that θ is linear, i.e., θ(x) = α(x − x * ), and assume that we are in the quasi-neutral regime. Then strategy B is an ESS N if, and only if,
Proof. Since θ(0) = −αx * < 0, we compute
and the later expression is negative if, and only if, x * > 1/3. The result then follows from Theorem 6.
Remark 13. The one-third law can be rephrased as saying that the critical frequency is 1/3 for very large variances. Notice also that Theorem 6 shows that the one-third law is not universal-as already noticed in [48] in the context of linear fitness, but considering the effects of higher order perturbations. Rather on the other way, it implies that it depends strongly on the fitness difference, given the integral nature of the condition obtained.
6.3. Critical frequency. We now want to extend the study of the critical frequency to regimes outside the quasi-neutral one. For convenience of presentation, we focus in the case of weakselection, with leading-order linear log-difference fitness. In this case, the asymptotic solution given by (7) is an exact solution of (2) for all κ. Thus, we can use it to investigate the critical frequency numerically. The result of such an investigation is shown in Figure 7 . Critical curves obtained using the fixation probability given by (7) and N = 10000. Notice that for very large variance the critical frequency approaches 1/3 as predicted by the one-third law. Additionally, notice that for order one variance, the critical frequency is still significant, being above 0.15. As the variance decreases, the critical frequency diminishes, but even at variances small as 10 −6 , the critical frequency is about 0.0035. For a variance of order 10 −4 , which would be the typical variance in the absence of weak-selection, the critical frequency is about 0.03.
These result suggests a number of consequences as noted in the following:
(1) For evolutions with an order one variance -not necessarily very small -one can see by looking at Figure 7a that the critical frequency is below one-third, but still at a significant level. So such barriers can be important for more general evolutionary dynamics settings. (2) For smaller variances, the picture in Figure 7b is universal and suggests that even when such variance is moderately small, the critical frequency can still be an issue for the ultimate fate of evolution.
Discussion
We presented a discussion about fixation for large, but finite populations within a continuous perspective. This was possible by the derivation of a continuous approximation that is valid in a large range of evolutionarily regimes, at the expense of requiring further regularity of the logarithm of the relative fitness. With this derivation, we can identify a number of evolutionary regimes with and without weak-selection assumptions. In the latter case, we obtain a selection-driven regime. In the former case, the possibilities are larger: we can also have a selection-driven regime, but also a balanced evolution or a quasi-neutral regime. In particular, it seems that there is some confusion in the literature regarding the concepts of weak-selection and quasi-neutral regimes. As we have seen, the latter implies the former, but not the other way round. In particular, [34] do need a quasi-neutral regime to derive the one-third law, as seen in section 6, and most population-genetics literature defines weak-selection as quasi-neutrality-cf. [14, 46] .
The derivation carried out in Section 3 suggests that in the absence of weak-selection, the infinite limit of the Moran process is not the usual replicator dynamics but what might be called the "log-replicator" equation
Notice that (12) is topologically conjugated to the replicator dynamics, i.e. (12) has the same equilibria that the replicator, and the equilibria has the same stability properties; in addition the sense of time is also preserved. In other words, the qualitative picture does not change in the infinite population setting. Notice, nevertheless, that such invariance will generally only hold for two types. For three or more types, the dynamics of the logarithm-replicator equation can be qualitatively very different from the replicator dynamics. In addition, there is quite a number of differences in the finite population case as discussed below.
We also presented asymptotic formulae for the fixation of probability, in the selection driven regime -with or without weak-selection. We consider mainly the case of at most a single interior equilibrium. For the dominance case, we recover the results of [4, 23] in a unified way. For the coexistence case, however, the presented formulas seem to be novel, and show that typically one might expect coexistence dynamics from infinite population emerging from some kind of dominance at finite populations. For the case of coordination, we derive a formula that slightly extends the ones obtained by [5, 30] and also allows the equilibria to be close of the endpoints.
Using these derived approximations, we showed what we called the near one-half law: with weak-selection, and when the leading order of the logarithm of the relative fitness is linear-and this is the case that leads to the replicator dynamics, cf [9, 10] -we show that, unless the equilibria is within a layer of O (κ) of 1 ⁄2, we have either dominance by A or by B, depending on the position of the equilibrium relative to 1 /2, i.e. if its slightly larger or smaller, respectively. In this sense, while the equilibrium gives some indication about the fixation pattern, there is a phase transition (in the limit N → ∞) effect leading to dominance of one of the types. In the small layer where the dominance switching takes place, and that we term the coexistence layer, both types have significant nonzero fixation probabilities. In the absence of weak-selection, the fixation pattern is even more varied. We present an example of two pay-off matrices, with Nash equilibrium located at x = 3/4, but which display opposite fixation patterns in the finite population case. In particular, we show that adding a constant to the pay-off matrix can dramatically change the fixation behaviour.
We also briefly study the case of multiple equilibria. Here the results are also new, and show that if we have a coordination equilibrium followed by coexistence one, then the latter can be a blockage for the former. On the other way round, we see that the ESS can now act as tunnel, and allow for the evolution to bypass the evolutionary barrier imposed by the coordination equilibrium.
Finally, we study the existence of ESS in finite populations. Using the diffusive approximation, we formulate an ESS definition for large populations, and show that it is equivalent to the so-called ESS N condition. We also introduce the concept of critical parameters, for studying the possible cases of ESS in parameter space. For linear fitness differences, this amounts to describe what we call the critical frequency for a given variance. Following that, we obtain an asymptotic approximation for the fixation in the quasi-neutral regime, and use this to obtain a rather general condition for a strategy that opposes invasions of a mutant to be an ESS. The condition is an integral one, and shows that the whole behaviour of the logarithm of the relative fitness is important, rather than just local information as in the selection-driven regime. In the special case of leading order linear fitness differences, we recover the celebrated one-third law.We then proceed further to study what happens outside the quasi-neutral regime. We then focus on the case of linear fitness for convenience of presentation, and provides a numerical study of what we call the critical curve. This shows that even outside the quasi-neutral regime, the critical frequency can be significantly non zero, and this might have significant implications in understanding some aspects of evolutionary dynamics.
Appendix A. Derivation of (2) First, observe that
Now we observe that
The last sum can be interpreted as a Riemann sum in two different ways: either as right sum, or as a midpoint sum. From the classical error bounds for the Riemann sums [6, 37] , we have in the former case that
whereas, in the latter, we have
In addition, we also have that
Combining these two results, and assuming that k = 2, we find that B.1. Dominance. For dominance of A, we have θ(x) > 0 in unit interval, and hence the argument of the exponential has a minimum at s = 0. Let s = κz. Then, using Laplace's method [7, 20] , we find
Hence, we have 
B.2.
Coexistence. In the case of coexistence, −F has a minimum at x = x * ; hence we have no contribution from the interior. On the other hand, θ is positive near s = 0 and negative near s = 1. Hence, the argument in the exponential has a minimum at both s = 0 and s = 1. Hence combining the previous calculations we find (16) I(x) = κ θ(0)
If F(1) κ, then the second term of (16) is exponentially small, and hence we obtain once again (14) . On the other hand, if F (1) −κ, the second term is then exponentially large, and in this case we obtain (15) .
Otherwise, if F(1) ∼ κ, let C = exp(−F(1)/κ) and γ = |θ(1)| θ(0) .
We now have that (16) becomes
Also, we have
Therefore,
B.3. Coordination. For coordination, we have that −F has a maximum at x = x * . Hence, we write
Then, if we write
Hence we have that
Thefore, we find that
